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The public opinion toward joining the EU was very positive from the early nineties,
however the policy of EU towards Croatia as well as former Croatian policy toward Europe
resulted in Croatia having to wait three years to be admitted to the Council of Europe. During
the past ten years, Croatian politicians failed to acquire enough information on European integration,
while the Croatian public failed to recognise that EU is above all an association of high democratic
standards, institutions and procedures, but also of free movement of goods, services, people and capital.
Croatia also has to face the fact of conditionality or regional approach and cooperation from which,
however, she can still get some advantages and endeavour. Within this context, Croatia should continue
with democratic, institutional, administrative and economic reforms as well as take initiative ahead of
the neighbouring countries.
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1. Introduction
If, on the eve of the first multi-party elections
in 1990, a poll, or even a referendum, had been con-
ducted on whether its citizens wanted Croatia to be-
come a member of the then European Community,
the great majority of them would have probably an-
swered in the affirmative. To Croatian citizens Eu-
rope meant at the time returning to where they be-
longed, but also escape from the Balkans and Yugo-
slavia; it meant their other identity, of which they
had been deprived, and hope of finding protection,
rather than access to the exclusive club of the rich.
This is why, in addition to national symbols, you
could see only the European flag on their cars, shop
windows, demonstrations in Croatia and abroad. But,
had you asked at the time those same citizens what
they knew about European integration structures, you
would have been surprised at the paucity of replies
and the ignorance of facts. You would not have ob-
tained much better answers from the politicians, ei-
ther. Few had even a rough idea of what was con-
tained in the body of European legislation, both that
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part passed by the European Council and what is
usually called the acquis communautaire, a rare non-
English term accepted in the otherwise English-
speaking Union.
However, the unfortunate policy practised by
Europe in relation to Croatia, especially before its
international recognition, but also the policy prac-
tised by the Croatian President towards Europe, re-
sulted in Croatia having to wait three years to be
admitted to the Council of Europe, whilst neglect-
ing cooperation within CEFTA, so that today it is
hardly accepted in the waiting room of the European
Union. The former Croatian President continuously
insisted that Croatia did not belong to the Balkans
and did not want to enter into any Balkan associa-
tions, but was leading the country, by his unreason-
able and stubborn policy, precisely into the Balkans,
which rejects Europe as its common home.
In some European quarters, which still nur-
ture nostalgic hopes of a new Balkan association,
such a policy was welcome. In a regional commu-
nity of the type they had in mind, Croatia was needed
as a motor to drive the whole region forward, but
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their main objective was to use this community in
order to weaken what they consider to be the Ger-
man zone of influence.
2. Failure of the political class
But, let us return to Croatia and to its possible
rapprochement and accession to the European Un-
ion. From this viewpoint, a critical but constructive
scrutiny is indicated of what Croatia should under-
take and what the Union can do to make this work
easier. During the past ten years, Croatian politicians
did not take the trouble of acquiring enough infor-
mation about European integration, or of sharing this
information with their citizens. The Croatian public
are not quite aware that the EU is above all an asso-
ciation of high democratic standards, institutions and
procedures, but also of free movement of goods, serv-
ices, people and capital. Unlike the other EU candi-
dates, the political class in Croatia has not even tried
to predict when Croatia might become an EU mem-
ber, what efforts are required for this, and what nega-
tive and positive repercussions this would entail.
In Croatia, the so-called acquis
communautaire, comprising some 30,000 pages of
mandatory EU agreements, regulations and direc-
tives, is something of a terra incognita even to poli-
ticians. Nobody has yet brought before the public
the issue of whether Croatia had any differential ad-
vantages - apart from its geographic position and a
relatively unpolluted environment - from which it
could derive benefit as part of the European Union.
There are not many of those who have tried to figure
out and explain to their fellow citizens what acces-
sion to the EU would mean for Croatian agriculture,
fisheries, shipbuilding, tourism, transport, banking,
industry, electric power production ...
The Croatian political class has failed the test.
Thus, for example, the Croatian public is not aware
that some relatively poor countries are to become
EU members before Croatia does and that the "Eu-
ropean pie" will grow smaller at an ever faster rate,
or that, since the introduction of the common cur-
rency, the euro, the Union has been driving in "dou-
ble gear".
Croatia has no option but to face these, and
other, unavoidable facts, such as the so-called
conditionality, i.e. regional approach and coopera-
tion as a condition, to use the wording of the Stabil-
ity Pact adopted in June 1999. However, even in this
obligatory regional cooperation Croatia could derive
certain advantages and endeavour to re-establish
cooperation and links with Bosnia and Herzegovina
on the basis of mutual respect and common inter-
ests. Croatia should also strive to renew good rela-
tions with Slovenia and Hungary, and to find a modus
coexistendi et operandi with Montenegro.
3. Reforms as a precondition
Within this context, Croatia should continue
with democratic, institutional, administrative and
economic reforms, since these represent conditions
for association. In addition to this, owing to its geo-
graphic position, Croatia could take initiative ahead
of the neighbouring countries in some of the areas
where the Union extends special assistance to can-
didate countries, such as transport infrastructure and
environmental protection. The Helsinki Trans-Euro-
pean Network, the Danube Convention and the Medi-
terranean Action Plan provide a good general frame-
work for the modernisation of European transport
corridors in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina,
for the environmental protection of the Sava-Dan-
ube basin and of the Adriatic confluence and the
Adriatic Sea, all of which could be extremely ben-
eficial for Croatia.
The European Union, for its part, should de-
velop a more nuanced approach to Croatia as well as
to Bosnia and Herzegovina - in political and mate-
rial terms. It should keep in mind that Croatia has
attained its long-withheld sovereignty by war and
suffering, and that Bosnia and Herzegovina, in spite
of the war and many victims, is still factually under
international protectorate. Besides, the leading coun-
tries of the Union, which are pushing for a fast "rec-
onciliation" between the aggressor and the attacked
countries, should remember that after the Second
World War the precondition for reconciliation with
Germany was not just military victory over the nazi
regime and occupation of Germany, but also its de-
nazification, while nothing similar has been at-
tempted as yet with Milosevic's Serbia.
The European Union must not overlook the
fact that the public in Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina does not understand very well the Un-
ion's assistance policy. The EU has, namely, granted




stitution and some sort of Magna Charta ... so that
all these problems are waiting for France when it
takes over the presidency of the Union, the period in
which Croatia is to start negotiations with the Union
on "stabilisation and association".
This brief survey requires also a post scrip-
tum in the style in dubio - pro parvo! European inte-
gration is, namely, an almost unquestionable 'must'
for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and
none of them has any real freedom of choice in rela-
tion to the EU. The European Union, for its part,
should bear in mind more than in the past that all of
these countries carry the heavy burden of commu-
nist mentality, that in a way they are leaving the
prison and entering the world of responsibility and
maturity. But, at the very moment of attaining the
capacity to decide on their own future, they are forced
to start preparations to enter a fully regulated com-
munity, in which everything has been decided be-
fore them and without them, regulated and fixed,
from trade and tariffs to quail hunting and cow races
in the French Department of Landes ... While, at the
time decisions of this kind were being made in EU
institutions, there was much wrangling over British,
French, Italian and other interests, all of which are
now embedded in the Union's regulations and dircc-
tives.
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Croatia between 1991 and 1999. It is even harder to
understand the latest proposal of the EU Commis-
sion for the distribution of European aid to the coun-
tries of the so-called western Balkans within the
framework of the Community Association and Re-
construction Assistance Programme for the 2000 to
2006 period. According to this proposal, out of the
total of 5.5 billion euros, 2.3 billion (or 42%) would
be allocated to Serbia, 1.1 billion (or 20%) to Kosovo,
with the remaining states - Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Macedonia and Albania plus
Montenegro, receiving only one and a half billion
euros, or 27% of the total sum. The remaining funds
would be used for the so-called regional coopera-
tion and for other purposes.
The European public is well aware that the
EU has considerably contributed towards the elimi-
nation of the war damage in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and that it is doing the same in Kosovo today. But
the Croatian public is also not forgetting that
Milosevic's Serbia, with Montenegro, inflicted on
Croatia damage in the value of nearly 30 billion dol-
lars, and that Croatia bore the brunt of reconstruc-
tion and of care for over one million refugees and
displaced persons from Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina largely on its own.
4. Conclusion
European policy is non-transparent in this re-
spect, to say the least. That is why both the Croatian
and the European publics are justifiably wondering
whether these unequal criteria are the result of a last-
ing fondness of some leading European states for
any Serbia at all, and whether Serbia can be expected
under such conditions to change and de-imperialise
itself. This state of things could be also caused by
the fact that Europe itself is at an impasse. EU de-
velopment has stagnated ever since the introduction
of the euro, and Europe is wondering how to reform
its own institutions, notably the Commission, how
to reach consensus in the Council of Ministers,
whether, and how, to give up the too short six-month
presidency of the Union in alphabetical order, how,
and at what rate, to open and expand towards the
new, poorer countries ...
Europe is also disunited over common defence
and security, not to mention common foreign policy;
it is in two minds over the need for a European con-
Of course, no account was, or could be, taken
of the specific interests of individual candidate coun-
tries at the time the EU created its laws, standards
and procedures. This is that fixed, continental
globalisation, which, as opposed to planetary
globalisation, does not include deregulation but
superregulation of many things, even when this goes
against one of the fundamental principles of the
Union, i.e. the principle of subsidiarity. European
superregulation is offered to the candidate countries
in the style of "take it or leave it!". This is why the
pre-accession procedure does not provide for real
negotiations that would consider the interests of both
sides and lead to compromise but consists exclusively
of an assessment of the level of adjustment to what
is termed the acquis communautaire.
The trouble is therefore in that the new de-
mocracies will not have a real option whether to join
the EU, as Switzerland and Norway had. It would
be, however, natural and democratic for their citi-
zens to decide on that, but not before being fully in-
formed about European integration structures. •
